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Introduction
A central issue in industrial organization and economic history is the degree to which firms use strategic behavior to deter entry and competition. Thus far, the empirical literature on strategic behavior has documented deviations from static profit maximization (consistent with dynamic profit maximization), and much of this literature has been historical. There are, for example, well-known historical studies of collusion and/or strategic behavior in the following industries: bromine; oil refining; railroads; sugar refining; telephony; and tobacco. 1 The emphasis on history makes sense. Because combinations like Standard Oil and American
Tobacco operated during a time when federal antitrust enforcement was notoriously ineffective, many such combinations openly engaged in predatory behavior and left a clear trail. Firms today are not so cavalier. There is, however, a concern about selection bias. All existing historical studies focus on the trusts that used strategic behavior successfully, even though most trusts failed. 2 As a result, we know quite a lot about American Tobacco and Standard Oil, but very little about hundreds of less successful combinations. Yet if you want to understand why strategic behavior emerged and worked in oil, sugar, and tobacco, you also need to understand why it did not work in other industries.
To this end, we explore strategic behavior in whiskey distilling between 1887 and 1895.
Our goals are twofold. First, like other empirical studies, we present evidence of strategic behavior. 3 The evidence is both qualitative and econometric. The econometric evidence exploits an unusual data set that allows us to estimate firm-level demand and cost curves for the Whiskey Trust, the dominant firm for the period under consideration. These estimates show that the Whiskey Trust set prices below those that would have been set by a profit-maximizing firm exploiting all of its market power. The estimates also show that after initiating an exclusive dealing campaign designed to deter entry, the price-cost markup rose. However, despite some limited success, these strategies ultimately failed to preempt entry, and the combination was bankrupt by early 1895.
Which brings us to the second goal of this paper: to understand why strategic behavior did not work in distilling. The evidence presented below suggests market structure played at least some role. Because a distillery of minimum efficient scale could be constructed for the cost of opening a modest restaurant, entry was not easily deterred. Along the same lines, as the data below show, there were many low-cost substitutes for spirits so that even if narrowly construed, the trust controlled a large market share, broadly construed, it did not. Compounding the effects of legal entry and competition from close substitutes, a large federal tax on spirits encouraged the development of an extensive illicit fringe. Illegal stills cost virtually nothing to construct; appear to have been widespread; and limited the trust's market power. Illegal entry increased after the depression of 1893, which increased the real burden of the tax, and after the federal government increased nominal tax rates by 22 percent in August 1894. The Whiskey Trust was also subject to multiple antitrust suits by state and federal authorities. While federal antitrust suits had little or no impact on market structure and performance, there is some evidence that state antitrust
The beginnings of the trust date back to the Peoria Pool of the early 1870s, a combination that was limited to distillers located in central Illinois. A much larger pool, the Western Export Association, formed in 1881. Industry observers claimed the association was created because overcapacity had depressed prices. To increase prices, the association set production limits for members, and members who produced in excess of their limit were required to export the excess at their own expense. However, from its inception, the pool was beset by cheating, market entry, and periodic price wars.
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After the pools failed, distillers organized the Distillers and Cattle Feeders' Trust, better known as the "Whiskey Trust" in May 1887. Modeled after Standard Oil, the Whiskey Trust was a bona fide trust so that when a distillery joined the trust it surrendered control of its operations to a board of trustees. Of the eighty-six distilleries that eventually joined the combination, only ten or twelve were kept in operation; the remainder were shut down. However, during the 1880s, state courts raised questions about the legality of trust arrangements. The trust entered receivership in January, 1895, and reorganized as the American Spirits
Manufacturing Company, a New Jersey corporation, in the fall of 1895, though this new combination never realized the market dominance of its bankrupt predecessor. Instead of reviving a rebate plan it had implemented years earlier, American Spirits chose a new form of vertical integration and set up a subsidiary company to distribute its products. This more explicit form of vertical integration had at least two attractive features: it was less susceptible to antitrust prosecution; and it allowed some difficult monitoring problems associated with the trust's rebate program, which is described in detail later in the paper and in other published work.
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The failure of the Whiskey Trust is puzzling when one compares the combination to its more successful counterparts in other industries. Like Standard Oil and the Sugar Trust, the Whiskey Trust controlled a large market share; was accused of using strategies to deter entry, such as predatory pricing, vertical restraints, and violence; and aggressively sought ways to cut costs. For example, trust-affiliated distilleries were the largest in the industry and were among the first to adopt the use of copper tubing, which enhanced productivity. The trust also hired a noted Japanese chemist, Jokichi Takamine, who tried to improve the fermentation process by using wheat bran rather than barley malt. Why, given all of these similarities with Standard Oil and the Sugar Trust, which by all accounts were highly successful combinations, did the Whiskey
Trust fail? The analysis below answers this question. 
2.b. Technology and Cost Estimates
The Whiskey Trust produced and sold alcoholic spirits. Manufacturing alcoholic spirits entailed grinding corn into meal; soaking the meal in water; adding malt, which converted the corn starch into sugar; and using a small amount of yeast, which initiated fermentation and converted the sugar into alcohol. After fermentation, the corn mash was twice distilled and charcoal filtered to yield alcoholic spirits. As this description implies, the manufacture of spirits employed a fixed-proportions production technology predicated mainly on corn and malt, and there was little, if any, substitutability across these inputs. Partly because grain was central to the production of alcoholic spirits, most distilleries located in the Midwest and there was an especially high concentration of distilleries around Peoria, Illinois. (Fixed costs are discussed thoroughly later in the paper.)
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Given this technology, we characterize the cost of producing a gallon of alcoholic spirits (c) as follows:
where k is the amount of grain, in bushels, needed to produce a gallon of spirits; P g is the price of grain per bushel; and J is federal tax on spirits per gallon. The price of grain, P g , is a weighted average of the price of corn and malt, such that,
where, 1 c and 1 m are the cost shares of corn and malt; and P c and P m are the price of corn and malt, per bushel. Although we do not know the precise cost shares of corn and malt, we do know that the production of spirits involved more corn than malt per bushel. In keeping with this fact, 7 the upper-bound cost estimate assumes 1 c = 60 %, and 1 m = 40%, while the lower-bound estimate assumes 1 c = 95%, and 1 m = 5%.
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Following the observations of industry insiders, we do not consider either labor or fuel as components in marginal cost; they were, instead, fixed or at least quasi-fixed inputs. Industry observers considered labor a fixed cost because employment remained the same regardless of output. Contemporary observers believed that the cost of labor was "not a significant factor" in distilling, and evidence for this position pointed to the fact that the distilling industry had never experienced a strike in its entire history through 1900. In any case, there is very little variation in wages over the period of study period. 14 Fuel was much the same. The amount of fuel used did not vary smoothly with output; and was largely independent of normal variations in production.
According to industry observers at the time, distilleries located in and around Peoria not so much because of the town's proximity to coal deposits, but because of its proximity to corn and underground water sources that provided an "illimitable supply" of pure water at just the right temperature.
15 Table 1 
2.c. Market Definitions
Alcoholic spirits were perfectly homogenous; their content and flavor were identical across all producers. Almost never consumed directly, alcoholic spirits were usually sold to rectifiers and distributors, who blended the spirits with water, brown sugar, and other flavors to create rectified whiskey. In contrast to more expensive straight whiskey, such as bourbon and rye whiskey, rectified whiskey required no aging and could be consumed immediately.
We suggest two measures of the trust's market share, one narrow and one broad.
According to the narrow definition:
where, trustq t is the trust's production of alcoholic spirits in year t; and alcoholic spirits t is the total domestic production of alcoholic spirits in year t (no alcoholic spirits were imported during the period under consideration). Within this narrowly defined market, substitution was costless;
as noted above, alcoholic spirits were perfectly homogeneous across all producers. According to a broader market definition:
where distilled spirits t is total domestic production of all types of distilled spirits in year t, which includes alcoholic spirits, bourbon, brandy, gin, rum, and rye whiskey. Within this broadly defined market, substitution was possible but not costless. Alcoholic spirits, and their derivative product, rectified whiskey, were generally cheaper (per unit of alcohol) and poorer tasting than bourbon, brandy, gin, rum, and rye whiskey. Of course, still broader market definitions are possible if one considers the production of beer, malt liquor, and wine. Table 2 presents data on production and market share. As Table 2 shows, a narrow market definition suggests the Whiskey Trust's market share peaked at 87 percent in 1893, while a broad definition suggests the trust's market share never rose above 45 percent and was as low as 20 percent in 1894 and 1895. Competition from substitutes for spirits, such as beer, appear to have played a role in disciplining the trust. This can be seen in Tables 3 and 4 , which report demand curve estimates for the trust. Although other aspects of these demand curve estimates will be discussed in detail later in the paper, they indicate that the cross-price elasticity of demand was such that a 10 percent reduction in the price of beer (as proxied by the price of hops)
would have lead to a 3 to 9 percent reduction in the demand for trust-distilled spirits. The crossprice elasticities of demand with other alcoholic products, such as wine and bourbon, were probably similar.
Did the Whiskey Trust Price Strategically?
According to industry observers, the Whiskey Trust initially used (unusually) low prices to deter future entry and to encourage existing firms to join the trust. 17 We refer to this period of low prices as the low-price regime. The low-price regime begins with the formation of the trust in May, 1887 and ends in June, 1890, when the trust began its exclusive dealing program. The analysis proceeds as follows. We first present a formal econometric test, which yields evidence that the trust set prices lower than those that would have been set by a firm practicing static profit maximization. We then supplement the econometric evidence with quotations from industry insiders and observers consistent with the idea that the trust was setting unusually low prices.
To test for unexpectedly low prices, we conducted the following three-part test. The test is based on the hypothesis that the trust refrained from exploiting all of its short-run market power because it feared inducing entry in the long run and because it wanted to induce existing firms outside the trust to join the combination. First, we estimated the trust's short run demand curve. We then calculated the implied (static profit-maximizing) price-cost markup for the trust.
That is, the markup that would have occurred had the trust behaved as a static profit maximizer.
Finally, we compared the implied markup to the observed markup. The observed markup is calculated using cost estimates derived from equations (1) and (2). We calculate the markup as: 18 Kadiyali, "Entry".
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[p-c]/c, where p is price per unit, and c is cost per unit. This three-step procedure is similar to
Kadiyali's study of entry deterrence in the photographic film industry. Kadiyali estimates price and advertising elasticities and then argues that, given these elasticities, observed prices and advertising expenditures by Kodak were inconsistent with static profit maximization.
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How this procedure works for distilling can be seen by noting that a (static) profitmaximizing firm, would set price ( p) so that:
where, c equals marginal cost; and 0 f equals the price elasticity of the firm's demand curve.
From this expression, a static profit maximizer confronting a demand curve with an elasticity of 2 would set prices 100 percent above marginal cost, while a firm confronting a demand curve with an elasticity of 10 would set prices 11 percent above cost. Suppose that the Whiskey Trust faced a demand curve with an elasticity of 10. If the trust regularly set prices that were less than 11 percent above marginal cost, this would be inconsistent with static profit maximization, and suggestive of strategic behavior.
Firm-level data on output prices, sales, and factor prices are employed in estimating the trust's demand curve and in calculating the observed price-cost markup. The data are monthly, and extend from April, 1888 through June, 1890, which covers nearly all of the trust's low-price regime. Output prices are the list price of alcoholic spirits for trust-affiliated distilleries located in Peoria, Illinois, where the production of spirits was centered. Data on quantity sold are based on the trust's sales of alcoholic spirits. This helps ensure that the results are not driven by the imposition of a particular functional form.
Also, to control for changes in income and changes in the price of close substitutes, a monthly index of industrial production and the price of hops (a primary input in beer) are included as exogenous variables in the demand equations. Table 3 reports regression estimates, the implied markup, and relevant confidence intervals for the low-price regime. The results are robust to alternative functional forms, with all three demand specifications yielding elasticity estimates of roughly 4.4. Point estimates imply that, had the trust behaved as a static-profit maximizer, it would have set prices 29-31 percent above cost. Using upper-bound estimates of elasticity (those equal to the 95 th and 99 th percentiles), the price-cost markup would have been no less than 13 percent. Observed markups, however, generally fall well below these thresholds, averaging between 4 and 8 percent during the low-price regime. Figures 1 and 2 plot the observed markups during the low-price regime using upper and lower-bound cost estimates. These figures also plot the lower-bound estimate of the implied markup (indicated by the horizontal line at .13). According to these figures, the observed markup nears the estimated lower-bound implied markup only briefly and is usually 16-17 percent of the point estimate of the implied markup. The fact that observed markups are so much smaller than the implied markup constitutes evidence the trust was setting prices 20 Demand curves are also estimated using quarterly (as opposed to monthly) data. The elasticity estimates and implied markups are very similar, and yield the same conclusion: the trust generally refrained from exercising all of its market power. 21 The quotations are from IC, pp. 81, 76 and 81, respectively. Government investigators based these observations and conclusions on the testimony of John McNulta, who acted as the court appointed receiver of the trust after it had entered bankruptcy proceedings; Martin R. Cook, a wholesaler liquor dealer; and Charles C. Clarke, the owner of Peoria distillery that was part of the trust before its demise. 13 strategically in an effort to deter future entry, to encourage existing firms to join the trust, or for some other reason.
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Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the trust's price-setting behavior was the result of ignorance of the demand elasticity, qualitative evidence does suggest that market entry was a serious concern for the trust, as well as the pools that preceded it, and that market entry was prompted by efforts to raise price above marginal cost. A government investigation of the industry conducted in 1899, found that only if distillers "kept prices low" would they not "provoke competition." For example, when the pools that preceded the trust tried to raise prices, they not only induced cheating among internal members of the pool, they also induced outsiders to build their own distilleries and enter. Outside entry played a central role in the demise of the aforementioned Western Export Association, which dominated the distilling industry during the 1880s. Similarly, after the trust abandoned its low-price strategy and began raising prices, "new distilleries were erected, and it was found impossible to maintain . . . high prices." Finally, the same government investigation solicited testimony that the trust often cut prices in an effort to induce outside firms to join the trust. 
Exclusive Dealing and the Whiskey Trust
4.a. Overview of the Exclusive Dealing Program
The Whiskey Trust operated an exclusive dealing program between 1890 and 1895. This program was central to the trust, and engendered much hostility from competitors and government authorities-federal officials claimed the program violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The details of the trust's exclusive dealing program are described in a previously published paper, and there is no need to retell these details in all of their complexity here. Suffice it to say that the trust used rebates to encourage distributers to carry only whiskey made with trustdistilled spirits. Between 1890 and 1891, the trust set the rebate at five cents per proof gallon.
Between 1891 and the summer of 1894, it raised the rebate to seven cents per proof gallon.
During the fall and winter of 1894, the trust reduced the rebate to two cents per proof gallon.
Compared to the price of spirits, the rebate was substantial. At the time, the before-tax price of spirits ranged from ten to thirty cents per gallon; the after-tax price of spirits ranged from one dollar to $1.20.
Some economists argue that firms can use exclusive dealing to increase their rivals' costs and deter entry. In the usual anticompetitive story, manufacturers use exclusive dealing to foreclose scarce distribution outlets. This makes it costly for new firms to enter. If new companies decide to enter, they must do so as vertically-integrated enterprises, operating both as manufacturers and as distributors, because incumbents have tied-up all distributing outlets.
Alternatively, new entrants could try to offer similar incentives as the incumbent to encourage distributors to carry their product. But this too could be costly if pre-existing contractual arrangements with the incumbent firm impose penalties on distributors who deal with competing 22 See Krattenmaker and Salop, "Competition"; and Salop and Scheffman "Raising". There is a competing view which holds that exclusive dealing promotes efficiency. Among other things, exclusive dealing might protect relationship specific investments and prevent competitors from free riding on a firm's advertising expenditures. See Bork Antitrust Paradox, and Posner Antitrust, . Given the nature of distilling, it seems highly unlikely that this Chicago School view of exclusive dealing could have applied to the Whiskey Trust. 
4.c. Testing for Anticompetitive Effects
We perform two tests to see if the trust's rebate program had anticompetitive effects.
First, we estimate the trust's demand curve during periods when it offered rebates, and periods when it did not. If the rebate program prevented entry and competition, the trust's demand curve would have become more inelastic after the rebate program began. This tests exploits the same firm-level data described above, except that these data cover the exclusive dealing regime which extends from June, 1891 through July, 1894. Second, using the same data, we examine the behavior of the price-cost markup before and after the implementation of the trust's rebate program. If the rebate had anticompetitive effects, the price-cost markup would have risen after the rebate program began. A caveat is in order, however: to the extent the trust initiated the rebate program because it had lost (gained) market power, these procedures will understate (overstate) its anticompetitive effects. Table 4 reports the demand estimates for the exclusive-dealing regime. The difference in the estimated elasticity of demand during the limit pricing and exclusive-dealing regimes, are trivial, both economically and statistically. However, stronger evidence that exclusive dealing had an effect emerges when we look at the behavior of the price-cost markup over time. Figures   1 and 2 plot the observed monthly mark-up across three regimes, where regime shifts are 23 This confirms the results of a previous paper, Troesken "Exclusive Dealing", which showed that after the initiation of the trust's exclusive dealing regime, there was a significant break in the trend in the price of spirits, with prices trending upward at a steeper rate than previously. The actions of the Nebraska courts, as well as the adverse decisions against other trusts, concerned the managers of the Whiskey Trust and prompted them to reorganize as an Illinois corporation in February, 1890. Oddly, managers of the Whiskey Trust pointed to the suits against the Sugar Trust as more worrisome than their own legal travails. 26 Once organized as an Illinois corporation, the Whiskey Trust functioned much like a holding company, owning a majority interest in all of its constituent distilleries. Except for the removal of the Nebraska Distilling Company from the Whiskey Trust, the distilling industry was no less concentrated than it had been before the Nebraska ruling. This can be seen more clearly in Table 2 Bailey argued that by acquiring distilleries for the purpose of "crushing out competition and of establishing a monopoly," the trust had "misused and abused the powers granted by its charter,"
and as such, "rendered itself liable to prosecution" and ouster from the state.
The ultimate effects of the Illinois antitrust suit are unclear. On the one hand, it is possible that the trust discontinued the rebate program because of the Illinois antitrust suit. The lower-court ruling against the trust was handed down in late-September, 1894; two weeks later, in early October, the trust announced that it would stop the rebate program. On the other hand, 27 A circular issued by the trust explained: "At the request of the patrons of this company, we have decided to discontinue the issuance of all rebate vouchers. . . . While we believe the that the rebate system has been a great advantage to wholesalers around the country, we willingly accede to the wishes of our customers." According to the Chicago Tribune: "abolishing the rebates is regarded by many as a severe blow to the trust, but the opposing forces were so powerful that the company did not dare refuse their demands." See Chicago Tribune, October 12, p. 8. 28 William Newberger sued and won when the trust refused to honor his vouchers. See New York Times, December 21, 1892, p. 1. Similarly in Gottschalk Company v. Distilling & Cattle Feeding Company, 62 F. 901 (1894) , a Chicago court allowed Gottschalk to redeem his vouchers despite the trust's claims that Gottschalk had purchased from non-trust houses. If the plaintiff had, the court said, it was accidental. Gottschalk had accumulated $35,000 worth of rebate vouchers.
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by the time the lower Illinois court ruled in September, 1894, the trust was already in serious financial trouble. Rumors of bankruptcy and receivership for the trust were heard as early as 1893. By the time the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in June, 1895, the trust had already been in receivership for several months. Also, the trust's management claimed that it was customer dissatisfaction that lead it to abandon its rebate program.
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In addition to the antitrust rulings narrowly construed, however, they might have been another avenue through which the courts mattered. When the trust refused to pay out on rebates it had issued, several whiskey wholesalers sued, demanding payment. The trust claimed that it did not have to pay the rebates because the wholesalers had purchased spirits from distilleries not affiliated with thrust. The wholesalers claimed otherwise. In one decision issued in 1892 and a second decision issued toward the end of the trust's existence in 1894, the courts agreed with the wholesalers and forced the trust to redeem the rebates. If the courts refused to enforce the exclusivity of these rebates they would have lost whatever power they possessed to undermine entry and competition. 
Did the Depression of 1893 Cause the Demise of the Trust?
Another plausible explanation for the demise of the trust focuses on the depression of 1893. During that year, industrial production and wholesale prices fell by 25 and 18 percent.
The depression of 1893 might have contributed to the demise of the trust through two avenues.
First, through an income effect, the depression might have reduced the demand for alcoholic spirits. This assumes alcoholic spirits were a normal good, an assumption consistent with both qualitative and econometric evidence: during the 1890s, industry observers claimed that more alcohol was consumed in "good times than in bad"; 29 and the regression results reported in tables 3 and 4 suggest industrial production (income) was positively correlated with quantity demanded.
The second avenue, referred to as the "tax effect", is less direct. By reducing the general price level by nearly 20 percent, the depression drove up the real burden of the tax (which was fixed at 90 cents per gallon), increasing the cost of spirits and reducing quantity demanded. In addition, increasing the tax might have caused production costs for the trust to rise relative to illicit (untaxed) producers. This in turn would have increased black market activity and reduced demand for legally-produced spirits. Figure 3 , which plots monthly data on quantity sold for the trust, suggests the depression of 1893 might have been an important factor in the demise of the trust. Before January 1893, there appears to be a mild upward trend in quantity sold, but after that month, there is a clear break in the data and quantity sold drops sharply. However, from this graph alone, it is impossible to disentangle the income effect from the tax effect. To identify the relative impact of the income and tax effects, we estimate quantity demanded under three counterfactual scenarios. 30 To arrive at these counter-factual estimates, we first estimate a demand curve under actual conditions. We then use the resulting coefficient estimates to create counter-factual worlds. In essence we ask, holding everything else constant, what would have happened to demand if the real burden of the tax rose, but industrial production did not fall? What would have happened if the real burden of the tax remained constant, but industrial production fell? And so on.
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Scenario one identifies the effect of tax changes, independent of the reduction in income associated with the depression of 1893. This calculation effectively answers the question, "holding income constant, how much would have been demanded, if the tax (in real terms) had never risen above the level it reached in December 1892?" Scenario two identifies the effect of income reductions, independent of any increases in the tax. In effect, this calculation answers the question, "holding the tax rate constant, how much would have been demanded if industrial production had never fallen from the level it reached in December 1892?" Scenario three identifies the joint effect of changes in income and taxes. 
Did Market Structure Cause the Demise of the Trust?
In distilling, fixed costs included labor, fuel, the cost of containers, and plant and capital.
That labor and fuel were quasi-fixed inputs is explained above. By law, distillers were required 31 IC, pp. 92, IC, On the cost of constructing a distillery, see IC, pp. 184, 203, [248] [249] . On the costs of opening a restaurant, see Pittsburgh Post Gazette, April 13, 1999, p. F.1.
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to store and ship alcoholic spirits in barrels. Distillers typically owned the barrels and viewed them as capital, using the same barrel repeatedly. 31 Economies of scale were exhausted at fairly low levels of output. Industry observers argued that minimum efficient scale was obtained when a distillery reached the capacity to process three to five thousand bushels of corn a day (about 5 percent of the market). As one distiller explained, "after this limit is reached," a large distillery "can not produce any more liquor per bushel of corn" than a small distillery. 32 In terms of the costs of plant and capital, a distillery with the capacity to supply 10 percent of the market could have been constructed for roughly $2 million 1999 dollars, less than it costs to open a small restaurant.
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Given the ease of entry it is probably not surprising that the trust's efforts to raise prices failed, even if the efforts to increase prices were accompanied by an aggressive exclusive dealing campaign. When the trust raised prices it induced new firms to enter. These firms circumvented the trust's exclusive dealing campaign by entering as vertically integrated enterprises. By doing so, they created their own distribution outlets and therefore did not have try to break into the existing distributer-ships locked into carrying trust-distilled spirits. Press accounts and previous research suggest that as these new vertically-integrated firms entered, they undercut the trust and gradually eroded its market share and profitability.
34 IC, pp.825 and 41.
Tax Changes and Illicit Entry
8.a. The Costs of Illicit Entry
A still with the capacity to produce a barrel a day could have been constructed for as little as $1400 (1999 dollars). Although there are no precise data on the production of stills, industry observers suggested illicit production was as high as 30-40 million gallons per year, or about 40-50 percent of legal production. In addition, illicit production was not limited to remote, Appalachian locations, as common folklore suggests. Government investigators in 1900 found that illicit production "was all over the county," including major cities such as New York and Chicago.
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There was also a class of distilleries known as "registered stills." These were very small distilleries, located mostly in the South, that were licensed by the government. At large distilleries (like those in the trust), IRS officials monitored production daily, and they monitored everything, how much grain was used; how many employees there were; how many barrels were used; how much alcohol was in the barrels, etc. At registered stills production was only estimated, and the taxes were paid based solely on these estimates. In the South alone, there were about 6,500 registered stills. The typical registered still had the capacity to process about 5 bushels of grain per day, while the very largest distilleries in the industry had the capacity to process 10 to 15 thousand bushels per day. Despite the vast size difference, large distilleries had a relatively small cost advantage-the pre-tax cost of distilling a gallon of spirits at a distillery with a 15,000 bushel capacity was no more than 20 percent lower than the pre-tax cost at a distillery with a 5 bushel capacity. central concern with this approach, however, is that IRS enforcement also probably rose with the increase in the tax, and it is impossible (with the data available) to disentangle the effects of increased illicit production and increased enforcement.
In the second test, we estimate the elasticity of the trust's demand curve following the tax increase. If the tax increase induced illicit entry, the trust's demand curve would have become more elastic in the face of increased competition. Table 5 reports the regression results.
Elasticity estimates are between 52 and 74 for the high-tax period, compared to estimates between 4 and 5 for the low-price and exclusive dealing regimes. Unfortunately, there are only seven observations available to estimate demand during the high-tax period. Given this, industrial production and the price of hops have been dropped as exogenous regressors.
Dropping these regressors makes it difficult to compare the elasticity estimates in Table 5 to the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 . To address this concern, the price of hops and industrial production are dropped from the demand estimates for the low-price and exclusive-dealing regimes, making it easier to construct meaningful comparisons across regimes. When hops and industrial production are dropped, elasticity estimates during the low-price and exclusive regimes rise only slightly, to between 5 and 6. As in the second test, there is also a concern that the effect of terminating the rebate program might be conflated with the effect of the tax increase. However, the estimated demand elasticity was not significantly affected by the introduction of the rebate program-as noted above, point estimates of elasticity are nearly identical across the low-price and exclusive-dealing regimes.
Section 9. Conclusions
We find evidence the Whiskey Trust behaved strategically. Initially, the trust set prices low in an effort to deter entry and to induce existing competitors to join the trust. Evidence of this "low-price" regime is based on the observation that the trust charged prices well below those implied by static profit maximization. When low prices failed to deter entry, the trust turned to exclusive dealing. The anti-competitive effects of the trust's exclusionary rebate program is confirmed by the behavior of the price-cost markup over time. After the trust initiated the program, the markup rose steadily.
Despite the trust's many efforts to deter entry and competition, it ultimately failed to do so. The trust's low-price regime might have deterred some entry, but after the trust began to steadily raise prices during its exclusive dealing regime, new distilleries grew-up, in the words of 36 Clearly, many of our ultimate conclusions mirror the arguments Jenks presented many years ago in the Trust Problem and his write-up in IC, see especially pp. 45-48. Nonetheless, we also believe we have extended Jenks in many ways. As noted earlier, Jenks did not have offer any of the evidence we have produced on demand elasticities, price-cost markups, violence, or antitrust enforcement. Nor did Jenks frame his analysis using the terms and tools of modern industrial organization as we have. 26 one observer, "like mushrooms in the night."
36 Initially, new entrants had to vertically integrate (into distilling, rectifying, and wholesaling) to get around the trust's rebate program, but over time, the trust's market position eroded to such a point that even firms that were not vertically integrated were able to enter. In addition to legal entry, the trust confronted competition from a large illicit fringe, a fringe that was made even larger following increases in the real tax rate in 1893 and 1894. Evidence that the illicit fringe rose with the tax rate comes from an examination of the price-cost markup and demand elasticities over time. After the tax rate rose, demand elasticity increased significantly.
There were several factors that undermined the ability of the trust to dominate its market.
First, while federal antitrust enforcement played a minor role in the demise of the trust and its rebate scheme, state antitrust regulation was probably important. Federal courts ruled that the rebates did not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, and had no impact on market structure or firm profitability. In contrast, state courts forced the trust to adopt new organizational forms; might have helped prompt the trust to discontinue its exclusionary rebate program; and reduced firm profitability, at least in the short run. Second, entry barriers in distilling were very low, and the trust was able to do little to raise them. As a result, it was subject to frequent entry whenever it tried to raise prices above competitive levels. Third, there was some competition from an illicit fringe, but it is unclear how important that was. Fourth, competition from close substitutes, such 37 See Genesove and Mullin, "Predation".
as beer, limited the trust's ability to monopolize the relevant market. Finally, the depression of 1893 played a negligible role in hastening the demise of the trust. Demand estimates indicate that even if the depression had never occurred, the trust still would have failed.
The implications of these results are fourfold. First, as one of several empirical studies of strategic behavior, this paper documents the use of strategic behavior in a specific industry.
Second, the results here complement the recent findings of Genesove and Mullin. 37 Genesove and Mullin show that the rate of return to predatory behavior in sugar refining was as high as 60 percent; the results of this paper suggest predation had a much lower rate of return in distilling.
The differences in the effectiveness of predation across the whiskey and sugar industries probably stems from the fact that entry barriers are much higher in sugar than whiskey. Also, the stark contrast between sugar refining and distilling highlights the importance of considering the trusts that failed (like the Whiskey Trust) as well as those that succeeded (like the Sugar Trust).
Third, the results here suggest black markets might play a role in limiting the market power of large, dominant firms. Variable definitions: k = bushels of grain (corn and malt) required to produce a gallon of spirits. Sources: IC, pp. 815-19, and 843; ; BLS (1902, pp. 446-47) ; United States (1900); and United States (1938, pp. 66-67) . 
